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7Annette Spellerberg
Maren Harnack
Urban quality of life is currently conceptualised in principally 
economic terms. As the decline in manufacturing activities, the  
rise of the service and knowledge economy, the growing importance 
of accessibility and globalising processes continue to reconfigure 
the economic competition between cities, quality of life enters 
the discourse primarily as a means to attract high-skilled workers 
and improve the cities economic prospects. Local governments 
increasingly seek partnerships with local and foreign capital, 
reorganising institutions and tasks to attract capital, including the 
“selling of place,” strengthening place promotion and marketing 
efforts. The rhetoric clearly welcomes wealthy, creative, high-skilled 
people, whereas disadvantaged and low skilled groups receive less 
attention in the making of places. Especially in inner city areas, 
high quality of life is promoted as spaces for ‘clean’ and convenient 
consumption with positive atmospheres and shiny images. 
Yet a plethora of theoretical engagements with urban every-
day life reminds us that the variety of jobs, the quality of public 
spaces, the range of shops and services, the cultural facilities and  
public transport are important place characteristics, but that 
more subjective aspects such as safe neighbourhoods, well-being, 
community prospects, social cohesion, happiness, satisfaction  
and social and spatial justice are equally crucial determinants  
of urban quality of life. These elements of urban quality of life –  
and how they are experienced by diverse formations of urban 
inhabitants – seem to be absent from, if not at odds with, the 
dominant discourse in rankings, policy and practice. Urban  
life, social cohesion and complexity are at risk in the dynamics of 
modernisation and adaptation strategies of cities. 
Urban Quality of Life 
at Risk
8This collection of essays emerged from an Anglo-German 
conference that was held in Frankfurt in June 2015, funded by  
the Research Centre “Region and City” at the University of Kaisers-
lautern and supported by the German Sociological Association, 
Section Urban and Regional Sociology (GSA; DGS). It focuses on 
tracking urban quality of life at risk. Gentrification, the occupation 
of inner-city districts by hyper-rich people, segregation and 
displacement of lower and middle classes can be observed as a 
consequence of these strategies. Questions addressed included
Which aspects of quality of life  
are affected by which trajectories  
of cities? 
What does a stronger segregation  
mean for quality of life for different  
population groups?
How satisfied are people  
with their living conditions in  
different parts of the city? 
When and why do people move  
into or out of cities? 
In which way is personal quality  
of life affected by place-based 
images and concepts of quality 
of life within cities? 
Which aspects can be observed 
as social innovations 
to improve quality of life? 
9For example, housing projects with new architectural patterns, 
community space and multi-generational living can be regarded as 
a coping strategy for housing, job and family related risks and new 
quarters for healthy environments and good quality of life. The extent 
of social stratification is limited and narrowed in certain city spaces, 
which may have a positive as well as negative impact on subjective 
well-being. 
We do not know much about the quality of life in globalised 
spaces, or about transnational areas within city life, (asylum  
seekers and refugees, illegal inhabitants). Neighbourhoods are 
perceived and evaluated according to different criteria (diversity, 
neutral contacts, friendliness, openness), but neighbourly help 
as a substitute for municipally provided social services is mostly 
discussed with a critical stance. Regarding risk, infrastructure  
is included in research on urban quality of life. Cities have to cope 
with worn-out infrastructure (water, sewerage, public transport)  
in need of renewal and renewed and technical upgrading, as well as 
with rising temperatures and water levels. Typically, the poorer  
strata of the population are more affected by pollution, waste, 
noise, crime, poor hygiene and climate change than more affluent 
population groups. With this collection of essays we want to 
contribute to the discussion and explore whether more inclusive 
forms of quality of life can be achieved under current economic and 
political conditions. 
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Matthias Bernt
Gentrification, the class-based upgrading of neighbourhoods, 
has been a prominent topic of urban studies since the term has  
been invented by the British-German sociologist Ruth Glass in 
1964. Tons of books and papers have been published, controversial 
debates held, and empirical studies have explored causes, patterns 
and dynamics of gentrification all around the world. This prominence 
of gentrification as a research subject is not only due to academic 
fashion. Gentrification has in fact become a risk for low-income 
households in numerous cities of the world. In this context, Smith 
(2002) has even gone so far to designate gentrification as “blueprint 
of urban strategies” applied worldwide.
In the last years however, the concept as such has come 
under increasing attack. Echoing the call of postcolonial thinkers to 
‘provincialise’ Western theories, more and more scholars today  
tend to see gentrification as an urban phenomenon rooted in  
rather specific experiences made in a handful of Western metro-
polises in the last century. More and more often, the concept  
of gentrification as such is thrown into question and blamed for  
being overstretched and no longer able to integrate different 
trajectories of urban change into its theoretical framework (see for 
example Ghertner 2015).
Gentrification 
under Question 
Conceptual Risks 
and Political 
Consequences
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This article picks up on these debates. I argue that 
gentrification has indeed become a term which is often used in a 
simplifying and universalising way. I see the major reason for this 
in the reductionist conceptual core of gentrification research which 
leaves aside the actual regulations existing in many housing markets. 
Based on an empirical study of the relations between gentrification 
and public policy in London, Berlin and St. Petersburg, I sketch 
alternative conceptualisations of gentrification which might open the 
way towards new research designs.
 “Much too simple 
and definitely obvious”
This was the comment of David Harvey (then PhD Adviser) 
when Neil Smith (then PhD Student) presented his “rent gap”-
argument to him back in 1979. Since then the rent-gap theory has 
become the arguably most prominent supply-side explanation of 
gentrification which is now taught in every undergraduate course 
on the subject. The essentials of the rent-gap argument are easy to 
explain: 
 “To summarise the theory, gentrification is a structural product 
of the land and housing markets. Capital flows where the rate 
of return is highest, and the movement of capital to the  
suburbs along with the continual depreciation of inner-city 
capital, eventually produces the rent gap. When this gap grows 
sufficiently large, rehabilitation (or for that matter, renewal) 
can begin to challenge the rates of return available elsewhere, 
and capital flows back.” (Smith 1979: 546) 
Whereas I agree with Tom Slater (2015) that the elegance  
of the rent gap argument lies exactly in its mix of simplicity, critical 
edge and normative thrust, there is also a major downside to this 
explanation. While the “rent-gap” has indeed superior explanatory 
power with regard to the economics of gentrification, it necessarily 
leaves aside institutional, social, cultural and political factors  
limiting gentrification. As a consequence, studies based on this 
theory have often either found it difficult to include actual patterns 
of gentrification in their empirical fields into the theoretical 
argument, or produced alterations of the rent-gap theory which 
tended to fit only the actual case under discussion. It needs  
to be emphasised that problems with bringing together universal 
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explanations with empirical realities are not unique to supply-side  
explanations of gentrification. Rather, the contrary is true as 
explanations based on a double cycle of “invasion and succession” 
have remained central to much research, but also led to numerous 
difficulties when applied in empirical studies (see Bernt et al.  
2010 for a critique of this strand of research in Germany, where 
demand-side approaches have remained dominant until now).
The main problem here is the essentially universalising and 
simplifying undercurrent which is at the core of both strands of 
gentrification theory:
Why universalising? The plethora of both supply- and demand-
side theories was developed against the background of experiences 
made in a handful of British and North American metropolises  
in the 1960s to 1980s – and is widely influenced by the conditions 
underlying urban change in these contexts. In these contexts, 
individual property as the dominating form of tenure, the availability 
of capital, a rising middle class and many other factors were self-
evident. Yet, when going outside these contexts, much of these 
“independent variables” become less obvious. Consequentially, the 
application of a conceptual framework originating in the specific 
urban experiences of Anglo-Saxon cities at a particular moment in 
time, has caused numerous irritations when applied in regions with 
divergent constellations.
Why simplifying? Both demand- and supply-side explanations 
of gentrification share a conceptualization of real estate markets 
in which owners have near-monopoly control over land, capital is 
available and markets work (by and largely) unchecked. In reality  
this is, however, a neoclassical fiction which does not exist even in 
the most neoliberal countries in the world. In reality, there is no  
such thing as a ‘free market’, but markets are politically organised 
and only made possible through a set of institutional arrangements 
and social relationships. Polanyi (1944) has described this 
entanglement of markets and societies as a ‘double movement’ 
and argued that Western civilization would be subject to a 
dialectical process of commodification and disembedding as well 
as decommodification and re-embedding of markets, with markets 
and societies existing in related tension. While housing is produced, 
valorised and traded as a commodity under capitalism (and this  
is well covered by gentrification research), it is at the same time  
a social right regulated by the state. The realisation of profit  
made from capital investment into housing is thus embedded into 
complex regulatory frameworks.
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Gentrification and 
the double movement in 
London-Barnsbury 
The relevance of this argument to the study of gentrification  
is apparent: The commodification of housing and its decom-
modification are closely connected and need to be studied together.
In the following, I present how this nexus impacted on the  
dynamics and patterns of gentrification in Barnsbury, a “super-
gentrified” (Butler and Lees 2006) neighbourhood in north London. 
The argument is based on an empirical study on “Gentrification and 
Public Policy” which was financed by the Alexander-von-Humboldt 
Foundation and conducted between 2014 and 2016 in London, 
Berlin and St. Petersburg. With regard to gentrification, Barnsbury 
is a particularly interesting case, as this neighbourhood has been 
experiencing upgrading since the late 1960s. Here, gentrification  
can be studied over a very long period in which the policy-environ-
ment changed repeatedly and fundamentally. Altogether, three 
phases can be distinguished in which gentrification unfolded and 
subsequently mutated: 
In a first phase which lasted from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, 
Barnsbury experienced a fundamental change from a deteriorated, 
working-class and immigrant inner-city neighbourhood with an 
overproportional share of rental flats to an area inhabited by a 
population of educated, white middle-class owner occupiers. The 
political economy underlying this change has been described in detail 
by the British geographers Chris Hamnett and William Randolph 
(1988) who then introduced the term “value gap” to the gentrification 
literature. In short, the “value gap” can be described as the gap 
between capitalized property value in rental and owner-occupation. 
The “value-gap” reflects the changing fiscal and financial structures 
for housing investment in Britain at that time which resulted in 
making the sale of property for owner-occupation far more lucrative 
than renting out. The background for this were complex changes 
both in the taxation of properties, the structure and policy of 
mortgage institutions and rent laws which squeezed the profitability 
of rental housing on the one hand, while making the appropriation 
of property for owner-occupation advantageous for households 
with a high taxable income. When the gap between the “tenanted 
investment value” and the “vacant possession value” grew large 
enough, developers bought up properties, pushed out the tenants 
and resold the flats to owner-occupiers. Within a very short period  
14
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of time, this resulted in a fundamental change of Barnsbury’s 
population structure.
In a second phase, gentrification was consolidated through 
the “Right to Buy”, a statutory right for sitting council tenants to 
buy their home introduced by the Thatcher government. Until 2014 
the “Right to Buy” resulted in the sale of 2.5 million council homes 
until 2013 (all UK), making tenants themselves the main agents 
of privatisation. In Barnsbury, where the Borough of Islington had 
embarked on a municipalisation policy in the 1970s and extensively 
acquired properties in renewal areas, the introduction of the “Right 
to Buy” had extremely severe consequences as it brought hundreds 
of properties to an already heated market. In a situation in which 
more than half of the total housing stock was state-owned and could 
have formed a massive barrier limiting gentrification, the “Right 
to Buy” managed to successively raze this protective wall and fuel 
gentrification through a continuous new supply of flats. This resulted 
in the consolidation and expansion of gentrification.
Currently, Barnsbury experiences a third phase of gentrification 
which Butler and Lees (2006) have termed “supergentrification”. 
The main characteristic of this phase is not only that the original 
gentrifiers are now displaced by a strata of “super-rich” in-movers, 
but most of all that the economic environment of gentrification  
has changed essentially. Three processes make current gentrification 
different: the increased importance of property purchased as an 
asset (in contrast to a place for living), the growth of private renting, 
and state-induced displacement in the social housing sector. All 
these developments are backed by the neoliberalisation of the 
British housing system which has been proceeding under various 
governments for the last 30 years. Here, the ongoing privatisation  
of council housing, the introduction of new mortgage products  
(“Buy-to-let schemes”) and the deregulation of rent laws have 
worked together in making gentrification more exclusive, but also 
more unstable and contradictory than ever before.
Barnsbury compared
How does this history of gentrification in a North-London 
neighbourhood compare to cases of gentrification studied in Berlin 
and St. Petersburg? While this is not the place for a detailed analysis, 
it is obvious that the visual expressions of gentrification as they 
present themselves through a different population, an upgraded 
housing stock and a consumption landscape designed for affluent 
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inhabitants are widely comparable in the three cities. Yet the 
essence, underlying this change is hidden from view. Here, a closer 
analysis reveals very different processes at work. 
Thus, gentrification in Berlin is by and large takes place 
within a (comparably) strongly regulated rental sector. Here, tenants 
have rights and this has resulted in a “splintered” and “delayed” 
gentrification (see Bernt and Holm 2005). In Russia, the privatization 
of flats to the sitting tenants has led to a “micro-ownership society” 
and a widely dysfunctional real estate market (Zavisca 2014) in 
which investors find it very difficult to implement regeneration 
projects on a larger scale, even within the most central and most 
prestigious locations. The outcome is a landscape where commercial 
gentrification is clearly visible, but poor and rich strata of the 
population still tend to live cheek by jowl.
Summing up, there are fundamental differences. While  
these differences do not make established theories useless, they 
imply a change of perspectives: First, we should understand 
gentrification as a generic concept (see also Lees et al 2015) 
pointing at a pluralist world of gentrifications, instead of a singular 
phenomenon. This complex landscape cannot adequately be grasped 
with a “one-size-fits-all” approach, but calls for context-sensitive 
research designs. Second, while gentrification studies have focused 
on the commodification of land and housing, the differences between 
the cases discussed can only be understood when they are put 
into relation to different institutional environments, histories and 
regulations. Thus, the state needs to be put into the centre of 
gentrification research. 
Analysis at risk
Far beyond academic splitting of hairs, this reorientation has 
fundamental implications for the role gentrification research can 
play in guiding political action. A research strategy which treats 
social, cultural and historical constellations as mere “specificities” 
overruled by a common underlying structure will do well in 
uncovering capitalism as the basis for gentrification – but get stuck 
when it comes to explain specificities. Policy advice, based on 
such conceptualisations, can only be difficult and any guidance for 
political change which goes beyond stating that capitalism should be 
abolished, can only be developed in an ad-hoc way. 
Bringing in policies, however, implies a wide-reaching change 
of academic practice, not only with regard to the theories applied, 
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but also with a perspective on sources of data, publication formats, 
and the positions of scholars vis-à-vis politicians and/or activists. 
This implies new risks – but also new prospects.
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Rowland Atkinson
One way of thinking about risk in urban contexts is not to 
focus on the source of risk itself but to consider how people respond 
to the city around them and the sources of danger they believe  
to be there. The paradox of fear, that many groups with low rates of 
victimisation experience high levels of fear of crime, underscores the 
way in which emotional responses are shaped by media narratives, 
mythologies attached to particular urban groups and places, as well 
as indeed the reality of violent crime in many locations. Fear can  
be experienced as a raw emotion in its own right but also witnessed 
in avoidance behaviours around public transport use, the time of  
day at which streets or particular areas are navigated. Another way 
to look at these issues is to scale-up these concerns and look at the 
way larger urban systems operate in ways that support the avoidance 
strategies and desires of many social groups to avoid danger and 
embrace diverse modes of security. In this way we can consider how 
perceptions of risk are engaged via the housing market as a means 
of more managing or avoiding stress and danger in everyday life. As 
urban historians have long pointed out, processes of suburbanisation 
Avoidance, 
Exclusion and 
Enclosure
The Management 
of Risk by 
the Super-Rich
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contained within them a desire for the avoidance of social difference 
as well as an interest in displays of social status and circumventing 
the negative environmental amenity of the city. Of course these 
responses require resources to be mobilised – the search for a nice 
house in a safe area is likely to be a more scarce resource. These 
issues are complicated still further by the way in which the risks we 
perceive, violence, abuse and theft, for example, are generated by 
inequalities in social opportunities and material resources. 
Material inequalities in wealth and income, as is now well-
known, have been rising and in tandem with new technologies and 
new kinds of real estate developments that facilitate attempts at 
social withdrawal and risk management. For the very wealthy the 
combination of gated communities, domestic security systems and 
powerful and co-ordinated mobility systems enable a deepening 
response to crime and disorder that is difficult to disentangle from 
motivations of conspicuous display. This may seem to beg the 
question of why we should concern ourselves with those social 
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groups, elites and they wealthy, who may not appear to present 
a danger to others or a problem for the cities they live in? Such 
questions betray a lack of interest in the very inequalities that 
generate many forms of acquisitive and violent crime. Similarly, 
to ask why we should take an interest in urban elites ignores the 
increasingly apparent way in which the wealthy lobbying political 
parties to retain material privileges, re-shaping and partitioning 
cities in line with their desire to avoid social difference and opposing 
political agendas focused on redistribution and access to core 
resources, like housing health and education. In short, the idea that 
the wealthy are not a social problem or unnecessary to urban and 
sociological studies can be dismissed but it can also be seen as an 
attempt to deny debates about the means by which deeper forms 
of community and social security might be founded. This short 
contribution focuses on the mobilities and strategies of the very 
wealthy as mechanisms for avoiding risk and danger in divided urban 
centres.
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Iceberg homes and 
secure nodes
The Daily Telegraph recently gave coverage to a £4.5m home 
for sale in Hampstead. The house was distinctive because most of 
it was underground, sporting, in iceberg fashion, a barely noticeable 
street-level presence that concealed an extensive home and gardens 
below. Yet homes like this are not a new phenomenon, they are  
a ‘bunker’ aesthetic that writers like Bauman observed some years 
ago. One way of thinking through the implications of these kind  
of fortress homes and the rise of gated communities in traditionally 
open European urban landscapes is to consider what these spaces 
say about social practices and patterns of sociability – why are  
such homes created; what fears and aspirations do they respond to;  
how indeed might such spaces come to reinforce existing inequalities? 
Of course this is now a world of pronounced inequality and one  
in which the public realm and social investment are increasingly 
at stake in a political vision of the world in which trickle-down 
economics and naked personal ambition are widely supported by 
politicians, think-tanks and publics. The presence of these trophy 
homes in the middle of social distress and poverty reinforced  
by government austerity programmes, like other European centres, 
produces if anything grater anxiety among those within them who 
see the risk of an envious mob outside. As the affluent residents  
of the street described in Lanchester’s novel Capital learn ‘we want 
what you’ve got’. 
To say that such anxiety is new is of course untrue, indeed 
it is widely shared and present among those who are less securely 
employed or rewarded and for whom the risk of burglary, to take one 
example, is much higher. The point here is that as the gap between 
the very wealthy and others grows domestic space has become 
increasingly private and inaccessible with wealth being used to seek 
out an almost invisible position in the city by the wealthy. Is this 
because of a fear of crime, a fear of intrusion, perhaps even a worry 
about public visibility, envy and a celebrity culture? In many ways  
it is a complex combination of all of these factors. Certainly much 
has happened to make London rather different city from what it was 
even a decade ago. Some of this change can be seen in the moving 
frontier of gentrification and displacement, previously in inner areas 
of the city and now more often via the demolition and re-modelling 
of public housing estates in the city. As many have suggested, these 
changes appear also to signal a kind of social risk management 
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strategy, with some commenting that processes of social cleansing 
are taking place and with the urban poor being further excluded from 
the city. In many ways then the city is being re-designed according 
to a plan to respond to the fears and desires of the very affluent, 
encouraging their confidence and presence by removing unsightly 
forms of poverty and social distress.
The changes we have seen in London and the appropriation  
of positional homes by international capital says something about  
the desirability of this particular city for those looking to invest  
and make further gains (the argument of economics), but they also 
say something about the nature of London’s urban culture and  
built environment which facilitates a lifestyle conducive to a group 
whose steps into public space are often timid, or at least wary of 
where and who is safe (an argument of the role of culture). For  
those not from London the development and purchase of respectable 
and trusting relationships is critical since, as many wealthy people 
suggest, when one has money the character of the world around 
them becomes more potentially threatening and grasping of their 
resources.
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Fortified domesticity
In the context of these material, social and political changes 
questions have arisen about London is for and who its political  
class really serves. How do the wealthy move around and through 
these spaces and what, more importantly, do these mobilities  
say about their own social politics and connection to the wider 
citizenry of the capital? Certainly having money confers the ability 
to occupy a home that is a fundamental base from which forays 
into public and other private spaces can be made. Here we find 
elaborate security systems, a supporting cast of staff and other 
service providers who enable a seamless engagement with space. 
The ultimate goal of many buyers is indeed to find a home with 
underground or drive-in car parking with internal exits (common in 
many of the newly planned skyscrapers for the city to come in  
the next decade). The so-called ‘poor doors’ of apartments along- 
side Versace interiors at the Battersea power station (Nine Elms) 
development are another example of the ways in which the wealthy 
flow around the city almost in tandem with its wider population  
yet which are impermeably separated by tinted glass, locked taxi 
doors or in lifts that piggyback on those used by lesser residents.  
In this sense the wealthy are not an extra-territorial presence  
in cities like London but enjoy the sense of being threaded through 
the fabric of the city while being able to negotiate or avoid what 
are seen to be more risky groups and spaces. Co-ordinated forays 
using personal drivers are an essential element of these networks 
and allow the conspicuous trappings of wealth, in any case relatively 
unremarkable in such an affluent capital, to slip from view via  
co-ordinated pick-ups organised by mobile phone. In this way the 
risks of urban life can be transformed into a lifestyle that celebrates 
the city as a delightful and open system whose resources and 
services they can pick and choose.
A politics 
of invisibility
With the ongoing privatisation and re-working of London’s 
public spaces and ongoing debates about the forced expulsion of 
the homeless, those on welfare and modestly paid workers, London 
certainly feels as though it embraces the wealthy. The renewed 
politics and apparent legitimacy of austerity measures is simply not 
part of the world of the monied, indeed it has helped to protect it. 
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Yet the mood of the city can only remain bullish to the extent that  
it really denies an interest in those struggling with over-priced homes 
and crowded transportation. The search for a space that is safe  
leads to London for many international buyers and those with 
money more generally, the sense of danger found in many other 
national capitals fades from view even if the instinct for safety 
never dies. London works for the wealthy because feelings of social 
exposure and personal risk can be limited and because districts 
and schools can be found that match their uncompromising needs. 
The implication, to return to the example of the iceberg home, is 
the existence of a fortress archipelago of gated and fortress homes 
linked by sealed mobilities and encounters only with those areas  
of the city that perceived to be safe zones. Whether we care 
about the qualities and feel of this increasingly securitised form of 
urbanism is one thing, whether the excesses upon which it is built 
will be challenged is perhaps quite another.
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Karen Lucas
Introduction
The issue of low mobility is one that has remained largely 
unexplored within the social policy and poverty literatures. Similarly, 
the issue of transport justice has been a subsidiary consideration 
within transport decision-making. Only within the United States 
has there been a long-standing tradition social impact evaluation of 
transport policies and programmes. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
requires that all government spending be subject to an environmental 
justice assessment, including Federal and State level investments 
in transportation. Even with this mandatory requirement in place, 
however, there has been very little systematic evaluation of the social 
consequence of in transport and travel inequalities more generally.
Outside of the US, evaluation of the social consequences 
of transport decision-making is more rare. Part of the problem at 
least lies with a lack of understanding when ‘low mobility’ becomes 
a constraint on people’s ability to participate in activities within 
different social and geographical contexts. Recently, there has 
been renewed concern amongst local transport policymakers in 
the UK in light of the current cutbacks in public spending for new 
Is Low Mobility 
an Important Factor 
in the Persistence 
of ‘Enclave’ Low-
Income Communities 
in the UK? 
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and subsidised public transport services (Campaign for Better 
Transport, 2013). There is a risk that people living in areas with high 
concentrations of deprivation and structurally low levels of physical 
access to employment can become excluded from mainstream 
society (Mandanipour et al, 2003). 
Deprived enclaves 
or excluded individuals?
The issue of whether different social outcomes are brought 
about as a result of our personal autonomies and freedoms or arise 
from the social contexts and structures surrounding our actions  
is an old one (Goodwin, 2005). As Kellerman identifies (2012: 35),  
“… power manipulations may bring about differential production 
and consumption patterns of mobilities, as well as growing flexible 
and permanent immobilities”, with quite a different implication for 
reducing the transport poverty of socially disadvantaged populations. 
In practice, it is often difficult to differentiate between factors  
of agency and structure and the two often become so intertwined 
that there is little point in attempting to untangle them. The most 
important issue for transport poverty is whether it is better for  
policy makers to seek to address the demand-side constraints of 
socially disadvantaged individuals, such as affordability or the  
supply-side failures of the transport system, such as an inadequate 
supply of transit services.
Our previous studies have identified that many socially 
disadvantaged individuals do experience an inadequate supply of 
services in the areas in which they live (Lucas et al, 2001). However, 
many of these individuals also reported very low levels of motility 
in terms of how far they personally take ‘possession of the need 
to be mobile’ (Kaufmann 2009: 58 cited in Kellerman, 2012) and 
appropriates the ‘field of possibilities’ to be mobile (Kaufmann and 
Montulet, 2008:45 cited in Kellerman, 2012). Indeed, many of the 
individuals we interviewed undertook very little travel outside their 
immediate neighbourhoods. Even when the level of local employment 
and the availability of goods and services in these areas were 
negligible, people mainly conducted their daily spatial mobilities 
within them. This low motility amongst socially disadvantaged 
population groups has been referred to in the social policy literature 
as ‘low travel horizons’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 2003). 
This leads to a question of whether these communities have 
effectively become ‘enclaves’ because of the immobility of the 
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individuals living within them. The Oxford English Dictionary definition 
of an enclave is ‘a piece of territory that is entirely shut in by foreign 
dominions’. Within the contemporary academic literature, however, 
enclaves have been more loosely defined to refer to groups or areas 
culturally distinct from the territory around them. This condition  
can be understood in either positive or negative terms depending on 
the nature of the enclave and/or the positional perspective of the 
viewer. For example in their study of young Turks and Kurds, Enneli 
et al (2005: 27) discuss how Turkish enclaves in London may on  
the one hand be a form of protection from racism, whilst also partly 
the cause of further isolation from the economic mainstream: 
 “There is clearly an ethnic enclave present, consisting not  
just of sandwich and kebab shops but many other family 
businesses that provide extensive services and, in many  
ways, a parallel micro-economy… But it has to be stressed  
that this resource comes at a price. Its presence may  
be a contributing factor in the young people’s relative 
disengage-ment with the broader structure of labour market 
opportunities and can lead to them being trapped in the  
ethnic enclave.”
Thereby another definition of an enclave community is one 
where the economic, social and cultural activities of certain groups 
are occurring separately from the rest of the society in which  
they live. Conversely, the literatures on transport-related exclusion 
have tended to focus more on the ability of different socially 
disadvantaged groups to meet their accessibility needs outside their 
immediate neighbourhoods (e.g. Department for Transport, 2006). 
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Geurs and Van Wee (2004) identify four important components 
of accessibility in this respect:
1. The individual component 
reflects the needs (depending on age, income, educational 
level, household characteristics etc.), abilities (depending on people’s 
physical condition, availability of travel modes etc.) and opportunities 
(depending on people’s income, travel budget, educational level, etc.)  
of individuals. These characteristics influence a person’s level of 
access to transport modes (e.g. being able to drive and borrow/use  
a car) and spatially distributed opportunities (e.g. have the skills  
or education to qualify for jobs near their residential area), and may 
strongly influence their total aggregate accessibility levels.
2. The land-use component 
reflects the land-use system, consisting of (a) the amount, 
quality and spatial distribution of opportunities supplied at each 
destination (jobs, shops, health, social and recreational facilities, 
etc.), (b) the demand for these opportunities at origin locations  
(e.g. where inhabitants live), (c) the confrontation of supply  
and demand for opportunities which may result in competition for 
activities with restricted capacity such as jobs, school places, health 
services, etc. 
3. The transportation component 
describes the transport system, expressed as the disutility 
experienced by an individual when covering the distance between 
an origin and a destination; included are the amount of time (travel, 
waiting, parking), costs (fixed and variable) and comfort-related 
variables (such as reliability, level of comfort, accident risk, etc.). 
4. The temporal component 
reflects the temporal constraints, i.e. the availability of 
opportunities at different times of the day, and the time available for 
individuals to participate in certain activities (e.g. work, recreation). 
Lucas (2012) suggests that it is also important to consider 
other cultural, social and behavioural factors, which may also serve 
to exclude some socially excluded population groups from mobility 
and participation, such as illiteracy, low-cognitive skills, lack of 
confidence and experience, mental ill-health and even drug abuse and 
other anti-social or violent behaviours. 
32
Case study description
Merseyside is a metropolitan area situated in the north west 
of England with a population of approximately 1.3 million people, 
densely spanning an area of approximately 645 km2 on either side of 
the banks of the River Mersey. Specifically, the study focuses on  
the two deprived areas (see maps below). 
Anfield is in North Liverpool, which is close to the inner 
city and thus has reasonably high levels of access to entry-level 
employment, key activities and public transit services. 
Leasowe is on the opposite side of the River Mersey in the 
Wirral, which is further from city-centre activities and services  
and also has lower access levels of public transit partly due to the 
lack of river crossings. 
 The aim of the study is to compare the travel behaviours  
of the socially disadvantaged sub-sample with those identified  
for the average population sample residentially located within the 
same study areas. 
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Local survey method
The data collection for the study was ‘piggybacked’ onto the 
regular Merseyside Countywide Survey (MCS), which has been run at 
irregular intervals since 2002. This randomly samples approximately 
2,000 households across the five Merseyside local districts. It collects 
household information, personal characteristics and a retrospective 
one-day of travel diary data from each person in these households 
over the age of 11 years. For the 2013 MCS, an additional sub-sample 
of 750 individuals, age between 16–65 years was identified within 
two different local areas; one with relatively high access to city 
centre jobs and amenities and a good local public transport services 
to other areas of the city region, the other with much low levels 
of access to activities and public transport supply both locally and 
regionally. 
Early results
A total of 502 people successfully completed the survey across 
the two case study areas, 230 of these were from the Liverpool area 
and 272 from the Wirral. Of these 241 were men (106 Liverpool  
and 135 Wirral) and 261 were women (124 Liverpool and 137 Wirral). 
The income profile of the sample was also well in range for the 
purposes of the study with more than half the sample that reported 
this information (58%) claiming a combined household income of 
£20,000 or less and only 18% a household income of £30,000 or over, 
across the two areas. In addition, approximately 50% of the sample 
(229) did not have a car available at all within their household and 
a further 38% (191) only had one car. Only 14 people had access to 
more than two cars within their household. 
Travel data
The whole sample completed the one-day retrospective travel 
diary that was conducted as part of the main survey interview. In 
addition, everyone was asked to complete a further two subsequent 
diary days and return them by post (a 7-day diary would have been 
preferred but was not possible within the programme budget).  
A total of 1286 weekday trips were recorded in the 488 valid dairies 
and were fairly evenly spread across the 5 different diary days. Of 
these, the Anfield (inner city) participants made 525 trips, while the 
Leasowe (city periphery) participants recorded a much higher level 
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of 871 trips and also tended to walk less and registered much higher 
levels of car use as both drivers and passengers and used more taxis 
than public transport. 
Next steps 
We are currently undertaking detailed GIS-based analysis 
of the revealed travel behaviours of participants in the survey 
and comparing these with measures of the potential accessibility 
of different key land uses using different modes of transport in 
Merseyside. The main analytical aim is to identify mismatches 
between the places people can potentially reach within their  
fixed ‘time-space’ commitments and where they actually travel.  
The results of this analysis will then be combined with destination 
choice modelling to weight the attractiveness of key destinations 
across the City of Liverpool, with particular emphasis on the  
types of activities and locations that are important to socially 
disadvantaged groups, such as entry level employment, welfare 
benefits offices, health and childcare centre, affordable super-
markets, etc. The hope is that although it is not always possible for 
policymakers to undertake such detailed and data rich analysis  
in practice, proper dissemination of the results of a study of mobility 
and social disadvantaged of this kind will help to provide an im-
proved general standard for their more future decision-making for 
this important policy based on the new understandings it brings.
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Malte Sänger
Ben-Gurion-Ring is a 
large-scale housing estate 
in Frankfurt built in 1975/76.  
It contains roughly 2500 
system-built housing units, 
mostly constructed with 
ELEMENTA ’72. Like many 
housing estates of that time, 
Ben-Gurion-Ring quickly 
acquired a bad reputation 
and is currently being 
regenerated under the 
“Soziale Stadt” programme.
Ben-Gurion-Ring, 
Frankfurt am Main
Photo-Essay
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Marcus Menzl
Only 20 years ago, urban researchers proclaimed the end of 
the city and anticipated its dissolution into the suburbs. It seemed  
to be an unchangeable matter of course that households with  
many options, such as well-off middle-class households, would leave 
the inner cities sooner or later, whereas the poor, the unemployed 
and migrants would stay. Today, we discuss the renaissance or  
the reinvention of the inner cities; in many cities the strong demand 
for inner city dwellings has started processes of gentrification  
and social displacement. What are the reasons for this fundamental 
turnaround, for this shift in housing preferences? What is the 
explanation for the new affinity to urban life of middle-class-
households? 
Most of the 20th century, especially the time following 
World War II, was dominated by Fordism, a specific economic 
and social system based on industrialised and standardised mass 
production and mass consumption. But Fordism also includes a 
very clear and dominant way of (private) life, with a fixed gender-
based division of labour, with a male breadwinner and a female 
housewife. Economically individuals experienced a high degree of 
Living in 
the Inner City 
Strategies 
to Cope with its 
Specific Qualities, 
Challenges 
and Restrictions
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stability and financial security, a constellation which facilitated 
consumption activities such as the purchase of privately owned 
homes. Furthermore, this era was dominated by the rigid separation 
of different urban functions, by car-based mobility, and by increasing 
urban sprawl. Eventually, this specific way of life turned hege- 
monic: the ideal living environment offered green surroundings, 
functional and social homogeneity, it was dominated by the 
perspective of child-rearing, and it implied a decidedly long-time 
perspective. The best place to deliver this concept was and still is 
suburbia. 
Today, this type of suburban life still has a lot to offer, but 
for many it has lost its attraction because our society has changed 
fundamentally. Most importantly, in the post-Fordist era, working 
conditions have become more unstable: especially members 
of the educated middle class tend to work in project-oriented 
constellations, often with rather meagre earnings. Working life is 
dominated by permanent availability, blurred boundaries between 
work and private life, and it increasingly demands speed, flexibility, 
and the ability to network. Furthermore, women’s aspirations 
completely changed: most middle-class-households consist of two 
earners. Due to these changed lifestyles the city has gained a new 
attraction as residential location offering short distances, close 
proximity of working and living, and a multitude of supporting 
services necessary to combine job, life and family. Mixed use and 
socially diverse inner city neighbourhoods also appeal to lifestyles 
based on contacts, networking activities, and on creativity. 
For educated middle-class-households in the post Fordist era, 
inner cities offer more advantages and opportunities than suburban 
life, and urban living has become acceptable also for families. 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the new urban dwellers will 
also be willing to accept the darker sides of the city, the challenges 
and impositions of urban life: higher density, noise, diversity, reduced 
control, encounters with foreigners and homeless people and other 
unforeseeable situations. From my point of view, the emerging new 
love for urban life has clear limitations, despite the indisputable trend 
to stay in or to return to the city. Hence I am going to argue that 
middle-class urban households adopt a number of strategies to cope 
with the complexity of urban life, with the variety of their specific 
residential demands, and with everything the urban reality asks from 
them. I will argue that many households tend to create hybrid ways 
of life. Their commitment to the city is much weaker than many 
observers claim. In many cases living in the city is simply the most 
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practical choice and without feasible alternatives – but that does  
not mean that all urban dwellers are dyed-in-the-wool urbanites. 
Often, an urban housing choice is a compromise, combining an 
affinity to urban convenience as well as an appreciation of some rural 
or suburban characteristics. In my empirical research I have found 
four coping-strategies or arrangements relating to these hybrid ways 
of life:
Type 1 Fighting  
  for privacy and control
The first coping strategy is a way to react to specific inner  
city stimuli. This type of urban dweller is fighting for privacy and 
control. The aim is firstly to control the immediate surroundings of 
the own dwelling and to prevent unacceptable disturbances such  
as noise, disorder, and unwanted people; and secondly and at  
the same time, these people tend to maximize their private space as 
well as their personal “benefits of space”, including the environment, 
an unobstructed view etc. (Bourdieu 1991). 
For this type of household, living in the city becomes 
increasingly ambivalent over time. They feel under pressure to fend 
off potential, real or perceived threats in their environment, which 
throw into question their residential aspirations and their decision to 
move to this place. 
Type 2 Separating  
  from the city to 
  increase security
These households are looking for segregated residential 
islands within the “urban jungle”. They prefer places which combine 
the amenities of urban life with individual residential demands – 
although these demands might be anti-urban. In Germany, these 
areas are not actual gated communities but they form more or less 
clearly separated communities.
The inner conflict of these city dwellers is obvious: On the 
one hand, they want to be part of the urban life and appreciate the 
closeness to jobs, social networks, urban opportunities of edu-
cation and culture. On the other hand they are striving to distance 
themselves from urban life and its related inconveniences such as 
heterogeneity, strangeness, and unwelcome contacts. Their strategy 
is to reduce contact and to create a kind of hideaway in the middle 
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of the city, which is not typical for cities: a place which guarantees 
security, privacy, homogeneity, control, and exclusiveness.
Their commitment to urban life can only be maintained 
through this anti-urban supplement, which attenuates and 
compensates the impacts of urban life. At the end, the coping-
strategy of separating bears many similarities to the suburban 
residential concept: It resembles a commuting constellation, a life  
in two worlds, inside and outside of the residential hideaway.
Type 3 Getting involved 
  to adapt the local structures 
  to the own way of life
The third coping-strategy focuses on persons who are com-
mitted urban dwellers. They have not only rational ties to their 
residential location but they are also socially and emotionally 
involved. In principle, they esteem the complexity of inner cities and 
are willing to add to urban life through their own activities. They  
wish to become increasingly involved, and act as co-designers of 
their neighbourhood. 
Although positive, this strategy bears one important problem: 
the involvement of this type of resident is usually strongly related 
to their own way of life. Hence these urban dwellers tend to engage 
in activities which adapt the local structures to their own needs, 
regardless of the rest of the population. Examples for this type 
are the transformation of urban places into playgrounds or the 
adaptation of local retail and restaurants to the needs of family-
orientated middle-class-households. 
Some observers call this “family gentrification” or “inner 
gentrification” (Frank 2011) because the drivers of this process are 
long lasting residents of the neighbourhood. They often moved  
in as students and after having established themselves professionally 
they may start a family. Consequently their lifestyles and their 
requirements regarding local retail, restaurants, public spaces, 
culture and child care are likely to change. In the past, households  
in this phase of life often moved to the suburbs; nowadays, they 
remain in the inner city neighbourhoods and seek to adapt them on 
their new way of life.
The most challenging characteristic of this coping-strategy 
is that these people fundamentally identify with their urban 
surroundings, appreciating diversity and social inclusion. However, 
by starting their well-intentioned activities and by making their 
50
neighbourhood more liveable (from their point of view) they 
accelerate the very processes of social homogenization and 
gentrification they disapprove of. Eventually, this coping strategy  
has to be considered ambivalent.
Type 4 Doubling 
  to satisfy all demands in 
  different locations
The last strategy is becoming increasingly popular: to add 
a different way of life. Instead of making one complex locational 
decision that would either lack conviction or involve a flawed 
compromise this group is trying to achieve both: 100% city as  
well as 100% countryside. These households combine different 
locations: During the week they live in an inner city dwelling;  
during the weekend they move to a permanent weekend home in  
the countryside.
There is no doubt that these households comply with the  
structure of modern urban life (job orientation, permanent 
availability, blurred boundaries of job and life, high speed, flexibility, 
etc.). However, in order to balance the intensity and the pressure  
of the urban rhythm they create a radical contrast  
at the weekend – far away from the job and the intensity of urban 
life, the weekend is exclusively family time, time for gardening, 
DIY, for intensive contact to nature, deceleration and recreation. 
Deliberately, this group abstains from work, Wi-Fi-connections,  
and other amenities of modern urban life. Consequently, spatial 
distance and the necessity to commute between the two locations 
are crucial to this coping strategy: a separate place helps to pursue 
the other, the non-urban life concept. 
This can be seen as a strategy to compensate the work load 
and the highly embedded urban life. These individuals are attracted 
by the promise of an idealised counter world without time pressure 
and heteronomy, where they are seeking to establish a second,  
a more self-determined identity and to complete or to balance their 
complex way of life. 
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The four different coping strategies illustrate the multitude  
of challenges and inner conflicts the new urbanites are facing.  
In the future we will see more and more diverse and complex ways  
of life emerging (including contradictions and enforced com-
promises), but also inner cities that change and partly reinvent their 
specific character. The new urbanites offer a lot of chances for  
our cities but they also bear the risk of losing or weakening their 
specific urban character. Understanding the new urbanites coping 
strategies may help us understand the imminent changes and 
possibly direct them in useful ways. 
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Maren Harnack
Large-scale post-war housing is often seen as a burden, 
compromising cities’ visual, spatial and even social integrity. Whilst in 
Eastern European countries and also in the Eastern parts of Germany 
large-scale pre-fab housing estates are traditionally desirable and 
respected neighbourhoods, in Western German housing policy has 
contributed towards their long term marginalisation, despite various 
programmes trying to achieve the exact opposite. The last German 
report on large-scale housing estates found that in Eastern Germany 
around 25 percent of all available housing units are situated in large-
scale estates, whilst in western parts of Germany, which are the 
focus of this paper, this applies for only 2 percent of the housing 
stock,1 implying that only a small proportion of the West German 
population is living in this type of housing. But a closer look reveals 
that the report only considered estates of 2500 units or more, 
whereas many smaller neighbourhoods were built along the same 
design principles. The very large estates considered in the report 
were often built following ambitious design competitions and aspiring 
at creating an entirely new and modern type of neighbourhood, 
community, way of life. Looking backward, the opposite seems to 
be true: many of those new, very large scale neighbourhoods are 
experiencing harsh difficulties: segregation, multiple deprivation,  
anti-social-behaviour, violence etc. Authors like Alice Coleman2 and 
Oscar Newman3 have argued that these are actually caused by the 
physical appearance of such neighbourhoods. 
Post-war 
Housing 
as an Urban 
Resource
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Today, the notion that modernist large scale housing is 
deficient as such obscures how enormous the improvements were 
that residents experienced when they first moved into the new 
settlement. For many of them central heating, fitted kitchens, indoor 
bathrooms etc. were luxuries unknown before. Also many residents 
describe a sense of community, at last for the first years, and despite 
the bad reputation large scale modernist housing has attracted,  
many still love their neighbourhood and their home. 
The bad reputation of large scale modernist housing can be 
traced back to the fundamental shift in German urban policy in  
the 1970s. At this time, the extreme hardship experienced after 
World War II including an extreme housing shortage had been largely 
overcome. The new generation of young adults had not experienced 
the post-war distress and their aspirations were markedly different 
from their parents’, for whom food, warmth and privacy had not 
always been something to take for granted. Contrary to their parents’ 
generation, who were grateful for a warm, bright and safe home, 
they rediscovered the run-down neighbourhoods with their historic 
housing stock and mixed communities earmarked for redevelopment. 
These not only offered a living environment totally different from  
the modernist housing estates, but the often large flats also enabled 
new lifestyles such as home shares. 
In Frankfurt, the West End was one of the neighbourhoods 
intensely fought over by different interest groups. As one of 
Frankfurt’s few historic areas not damaged by the war, it became 
a site of speculation for new developments. Historic villas were 
evicted and demolished to make space for new office towers. In the 
late 1960s, students as well as long standing Frankfurters started 
do fight for the historic neighbourhoods by squatting and repairing 
(instandbesetzen) the evicted houses, but also by physically opposing 
demolition. 
Constructing 
a negative image
The overall political plan had been to re-house the inhabitants 
of the run-down historic neighbourhoods in newly built modernist 
housing estates like the Nordweststadt, but quite different from a few 
years earlier this option was no longer attractive. On the contrary, 
those estates were seen as the counter-point to refurbishing existing 
inner-city neighbourhoods prone to physical decay and social 
disintegration. Sociological interpretations inspired by neo-marxist 
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theory criticised that “The […] atomisation of society in housing 
estates is not only an unintended side effect of bourgeois city 
planning ideology, but is consciously planned for as means to instill 
bourgeois and petit-bourgeois values in the working class. This  
does not only impede solidarity among estate dwellers, but makes 
them vulnerable for ideologies and patterns of behaviour propagated 
by bourgeois mass media”.4 
In addition to the neo-marxist critique the reputation of large 
scale housing estates was affected by the scandal-ridden break  
down of the Neue Heimat, a union-owned property holding engaged 
in the building of large scale estates, and also by the subsequent rise 
of neoliberalism. 
These developments lead to a fundamental shift in the 
federal German housing policy. The responsibility for social housing 
was delegated to the Bundesländer (federal states) and funds were 
increasingly re-allocated towards urban renewal and small scale 
refurbishment projects. In addition to this, continuing subsidies for 
single family homes enabled many better-off families to move from 
modernist housing estates to newly built, suburban detached homes. 
The flats they vacated were taken by new groups on the German 
housing marked, e.g. Gastarbeiter-families, who moved to Germany 
after the (mostly low-skilled) breadwinner had decided to stay for 
good. The associated rise of welfare recipients, migrants and low 
skilled workers in the social composition was not perceived as an 
outcome of various policies and constraints, but rather as something 
inherent in the estates themselves. 
Today, our view on the large scale housing estates built in the 
1960s and 1970s is still dominated by these developments. Many 
programmes have been set up, geared specifically to improve large 
scale modernist housing estates5 and most of them now are un- 
remarkable in terms of crime and anti social behaviour. Accordingly, 
the main criticism these estates are confronted with today is  
not so much the insufficient quality of housing itself, but the lack of 
urbanity these neighbourhoods show when compared to the inner 
city areas they were once built to replace and which have been 
refurbished now. Most people, lay people as well as planners and 
architects, tend to see modernist housing estates as anomalies, 
planning mistakes or as neighbourhoods that ideally should be rebuilt.
Unfortunately the positive aspects of modernist housing are 
obscured by this. In the large conurbations, the pre-war housing 
stock is now sought after by middle and even upper class residents 
and the much criticised housing of the 1960s and 1970s provides 
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relatively central, affordable options for those with constricted 
financial means. In addition to that, much of the housing stock in 
question is still belonging to publicly owned holdings, which adds 
security for the tenant. Also, most tenants within these estates  
do not share the negative view of the outsiders. They appreciate  
the often well laid out flats, the convenience of their living 
arrangements and especially the greenery around them, which 
otherwise is often criticised as wasted space with no qualities. 
Reality check
In a small research project in the Frankfurt Rhine-Main Region, 
an attempt was made to catalogue virtually all housing which is  
large scale in the sense that it has a markedly different scale setting 
it apart from its surroundings. This takes into account that during  
the 1950s, 60s and 70s many smaller municipalities also built 
modernist housing, albeit on a scale much smaller than considered  
in the 1994 national report on large scale housing estates with its 
2500 unit threshold. 
The outcome of this exercise was rather surprising: in many 
relatively small municipalities in the region, more than 20 percent of 
the housing stock is in large scale modernist housing, in many more 
this number exceeds 15 percent. This poses a number of questions 
that have yet to be answered: What are the specific planning 
histories of these developments? What is their role in the local as 
well as the regional housing market? How have they been integrated 
into the local urban fabric? What are residents’ experiences? Do 
some of them qualify to be listed?
However, it is obvious that the sheer number of units in 
relatively large scale modernist housing estates means that these 
structures are not “anomalies” which should be erased whenever 
possible, but that they constitute a large piece of our built environ-
ment. For their residents they offer high quality urban life that 
combines the pleasure of suburban greenery with the efficiency and 
the amenities of modern flats. The currently overheated real estate 
market in many urban centres make these housing options more 
important than ever, often remaining the only viable choice for those 
unable to afford either a more central locations or a car to commute. 
But whilst markets make modernist housing more important for  
many urban dwellers, they also create new pressures: Housing 
companies might feel tempted to cash in on their stock to fund new 
projects or to clear debts. 
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In other cases the lush greenery around the buildings attracts 
new attention as “unused” land that could be turned into plots 
for new housing, thus not only alleviating the current shortage, 
but also adding some of the “urbanity” these neighbourhoods are 
allegedly lacking. Whether the residents require more urbanity 
or just improved maintenance arrangements remains open. After 
the shortcomings of modernist housing have been researched 
extensively, research into its qualities remains scarce. However, in 
the current climate of urban growth and booming property markets, 
residents of these until now not very sought after locations  
are in danger of losing the qualities their housing arrangements  
have provided so far. And as they still belong to the least well-off 
parts of urban societies they have little choice to move elsewhere 
and will feel the unmitigated impact of upcoming changes. 
Notes
1 Deutscher Bundestag (1994, Hg.) Großsiedlungsbericht 1994. Drucksache 
12/8406, Bonn
2 Alice Coleman (1984) Utopia on Trial. Vision and reality in planned housing. 
Hilary Shipman, London
3 Oscar Newman (1973) Defensible Space. Crime Prevention Through Urban 
Design. Macmillan Publishing, New York
4 Grüttner, Michael (1976) Wem die Stadt gehört. Stadtplanung und 
Stadtentwicklung in Hamburg 1965–1975. Hamburg, p. 213.
5 E.g. the progamme Soziale Stadt: see “Leitfaden zur Ausgestaltung der 
Gemeinschaftsinitiative ‘Soziale Stadt’ (zweite Fassung vom 1. März 2000)”,  
in: Holl, Christian (2002, Ed.) Soziale Stadt. Ein politisches Programm in der  
Diskussion, Stuttgart/München, p. 98.
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Simon Parker
When urban sociology first began in Chicago in the 1920s  
most of its key practitioners were ethnographers of urban migration. 
At that time Chicago was one of the fastest growing cities in the 
world and this could only have been possible through the addition  
of tens of thousands of new residents from the Unites States  
(and especially the African American communities of the South) as 
well as Ireland, Poland, Germany and Southern Europe. To under-
stand this complex pattern of exogenous settlement required  
new methods of social enquiry – such as the neighborhood survey 
pioneered by Jane Addams at Hull House, as well as participant 
observation and urban reportage, the ‘dirty hands’ research made 
famous by the former journalist Robert Park (Parker 2015). 
A century later and with the mass primary migration into 
America’s exploding metropolis largely confined to history –  
urban sociology also moved from being a dynamic to a more static 
discipline and quite naturally shifted its attention to sui generis issues 
such as crime, housing, employment, poverty and more recently 
to social issues surrounding race, ethnicity and gender. In Europe 
where post-war migration from former colonies in Africa, Asia and 
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the Caribbean contributed significantly to the presence of ethnic 
minorities in France and the United Kingdom, and in West Germany 
where the main incomer populations were from the German speaking 
populations of Eastern Europe together with Southern European 
migrant and Turkish ‘guest’ workers – there has been a more long 
running engagement with the study of new migrant communities. 
However, apart from some very community and often geographically 
specific ethnographic studies of urban migrant populations – there 
has been little in the way of theoretical or methodological innovation 
at least in term of urban migration in the Global North. This contrasts 
with an increasing body of important and exciting work on migration 
and urbanization in the Global South that is encouraging urban 
scholars elsewhere to look more closely at western cities and 
territories for symptoms of post-colonial segregation and control, 
while listening more attentively to the voices of a growing subaltern 
resistance on the part of those that European states deem ‘illegal’ 
from Lesvos to Idomeni to Calais.
At the same time, while the national and supra-national scale 
of government has developed ever more exclusionary forms of 
bordering and biopolitical sorting beyond, at and within the frontiers 
of ‘Fortress Europe’, there has been a growing humanitarian solidarity 
and the embrace of a new civic cosmopolitanism on the part of  
city administrations on the front line of the Mediterranean migration 
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crisis. In Palermo, the mayor, Leoluca Orlando prefers to refer to  
the city as ‘Arab-Norman’ and a city of the Middle East rather  
than a European city. Describing the 20,000 deaths in the Medi- 
terranean since 1990 as a state orchestrated genocide, he directly 
implicates the European Union’s refusal to provide safe and  
legal routes for those fleeing persecution with mass homicide. 
Orlando is frequently to be seen on the quayside of the port 
welcoming hundreds of refugees – often the only survivors of 
appalling mass drownings. At his insistence the first people to greet 
the new arrivals are not armed police but aid workers from the  
Red Cross and Save the Children. The emphasis in terms of the local 
authority is very firmly on ‘accoglienza’ (welcome) rather than  
the anti-smuggling and ‘illegal entry’ focused border policing of 
the Italian and EU authorities. But while Palermo does not have as 
significant a population of asylum seekers as some other Sicilian 
cities where initial and second stage reception centres are more 
present, there has been a significant change in the ethnic make-up  
of the city due to various forms of migration since the 1980s.
The City Council has shown its commitment to recognizing 
Palermo’s increasingly diverse population by instituting a Council  
of Cultures (Consulta delle culture). The council’s members are 
elected from among the city’s some 125 different nationalities and 
100 spoken languages. The President of the Cultural Council defines 
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its mission as “promoting the richness of culture and the capacity 
for dialogue among the various communities, uniting political 
representation with different cultural and social activities. It is also 
responsible for ensuring that new residents of the city are able to 
take their place as full citizens in the city’s political and institutional 
life, regardless of their nationality or immigration status.
This ambition has been severely challenged recently by a  
near fatal gun attack on three young Gambians (one of whom who 
remains in a coma) in the centre of Palermo following a series  
of unprovoked assaults by locals from the Ballarò neighbourhood  
who have suspected links to the city’s criminal underground.1  
A demonstration against racist violence sponsored by local political 
leaders, civic associations and migrants in Ballarò failed to attract 
participation from local residents some of whom, according to  
local newspaper reports, abused and insulted the demonstrators2. 
If as Mayor Orlando has declared – the presence of a cosmopolitan 
city of migration constitutes an existential challenge for the Mafia 
because it can no longer rely on the historic ties of dependence 
among the close knit communities that it has dominated for 
generations – then it is no surprise that organised crime has declared 
war on Sicily’s more recent migrants.
Meanwhile in the small fishing town of Riace on the Calabrian 
coast, which had been suffering from a declining population and 
economy for many years, the decision of the city’s mayor ‘Mimmo’ 
(Domenico Lucano) to welcome over 6000 refugees to his small 
town of only 1500 inhabitants has brought the municipality global 
attention.3 The initiative happened almost by accident when on  
1st July 1998 a ship with 218 Kurds on board became shipwrecked 
on the coast close to Riace. The refugees had been planning to head 
for Greece but had gone off course with disastrous consequences. 
Suffering from hypothermia and nearly dead from starvation  
most of the refugees had given up any hope of survival when Riace’s 
mayor decided to respond to the emergency and called on the town’s 
inhabitants to take in the survivors. Many of the survivors decided 
to stay in Riace and from then on other new residents have arrived 
including young single men from Tunisia, Senegal and Eritrea and 
women and children from Syria and Algeria fleeing war and poverty. 
Each new resident receives 600 Euros a month from the municipality 
and is given an older abandoned house to occupy. In one case  
a young Afghan woman was able to have her house made habitable 
thanks to a local builder and in exchange she provides child care and 
looks after her neighbour’s elderly relatives who have Alzheimer’s.
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In Calais and Dunkirk, by contrast, informal encampments of 
refugees seeking to escape to Britain to join families or friends  
on the other side of the Channel face violent racist vigilantes, often 
no less violent and racist policing and extremely hostile public 
authorities across this uniquely extended and protected Anglo-
French frontier. Agamben’s term ‘bare life’ is often overused by 
sociologists who want to depict some generic form of abjection but 
this deliberate suspension of even the most elementary forms of 
human dignity – a place to wash and to perform bodily functions, 
to sleep without the threat of water inundating you and your family 
or strangers tearing down your shelter, being able to stay warm 
and heat one’s dwelling, deciding when and what or even if you 
eat – these are the experiences not just of adults but often of 
unaccompanied and orphaned children for whom no state authority 
or international aid organisation feels any type of responsibility.
The anthropologist Michel Agier has described the process 
by which the camp has literally been ‘containerised’ with half the 
inhabitants forced to live in adapted shipping containers and kept 
under round the clock surveillance – a ‘tuigdorp’ (scum village) 
strategy previously used by local authorities in the Netherlands to 
separate out ‘unruly’ social housing tenants from their respectable 
neighbours.4 Here, arguably for the first time we are witnessing  
the creation of a type of state sponsored bidonville in the heart of  
the affluent continent of Europe in which the inhabitants are 
distinguished not only by their relative poverty but also by their right 
even to be resident within the territory.
Social scientists with an interest and concern for the changing 
nature of the city are thus confronted with a new set of theoretical 
and methodological challenges that I would summarise as follows
The need for an understanding of how precarity and 
vulnerability is becoming a feature of many European towns 
and cities with migrant populations as a deliberate act of 
public policy
Thinking through the implications of these forms of fractured 
citizenship in terms of strategies of inclusion, community 
relations, health, security and well-being
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Accounting for the burgeoning of what we might call ‘black 
sites’ of population management including immigration 
detention ‘hotspots’, closed camps and segregated areas for 
those with limited or unrecognised immigration status
Devising research methods capable of capturing wider 
geographies and histories of displacement and social harm and 
the micro, meso and macro lifeworlds of these new forced 
mobilities
Contributing to a research praxis that is supportive of 
humanitarian and rights-based solutions to the challenge 
of global conflict, poverty and economic security, which 
nevertheless retains a critical and rigorous evidence-based 
approach to the furtherance of social knowledge
This research agenda is challenging not least because it 
requires us to step outside the confines and frontiers of our own 
disciplines and sub-disciplines and really listen to the voices and 
experiences of those ‘new urban subjects’ who represent the human 
face of the disaster capitalism of the early 21st century.
Notes
1 http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/04/04/news/rissa_con_sparatoria_
tra_giovani_di_ballaro_e_del_gambia_un_fermato-136868284/?refresh_ce
2 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2016/04/10/in-1500-
sfilano-per-yusupha-la-gente-di-ballaro-non-cePalermo01.html?ref=search
3 http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/11/20/immigrazione-profughi-salvano-
riace-dal-declino/419833/
4 http://www.dezeen.com/2012/12/05/scum-villages-planned-for-amsterdam/
Reference
Parker, S. (2015) Urban Theory and the Urban Experience: Encountering the 
City, 2nd Edition. Routledge, London and New York.
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Annette Spellerberg
In urban and rural environments, grass-root organisations 
and self-help approaches, especially by senior citizens, are emerging 
to create co-housing projects. These initiatives aim for active and 
supportive neighbourhoods and communities, where adults live 
together voluntarily and purposefully. Affordable living conditions, 
barrier-free units with high environmental standards and social 
cohesion promise to enhance the individual quality of life as well as 
developing a sustainable society. As such, these utopian ambitions 
appear to be a showcase for ageing in place, overcoming isolation 
and seeking sustainable lifestyles. 
Usually one or more individuals have the idea of starting a  
co-housing project, but lack fellow campaigners, sites or structures. 
By a rather lengthy process they try to establish a group, form a  
legal company, go public, and engage other stakeholders such as local 
authorities, planners, lawyers and financial institutions. Over time 
they gain recognition as they make demands on land use or existing 
structures which may be supported or rejected by towns or villages. 
They depend not only on their own resources – not least financial 
contributions, high commitment and power of endurance – but also 
external resources, such as local support, acceptance within the 
population, and support from consultants, bank loans and competent 
architects. The whole process results in new or remodelled dwellings, 
or a place that matches ideas of sustainability and community life.
Members of housing communities endure many difficulties 
and challenges during the long planning phase. Faced by long and 
complicated group processes and the challenges of going into 
business and constructing buildings, many initiatives do not make it 
Co-housing – 
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into real life. Nobody knows whether and when the planning efforts 
will become reality and where they will end up. In most cases  
the planning process takes more than five years, including occasional 
setbacks. Managing the time frame is very difficult, especially for 
seniors who need a clear perspective for their health and mobility. 
“We already lost three members, because it’s not fast enough.” 
(Mainz. L. 215–216)
These insights are based on a research project “Cooperatives 
and Co-housing of older people. German Case Studies in the 
Rhineland-Palatinate”. The goal of the research project (6/2013 – 
5/2015) was to help identify hurdles and success factors for  
co-ops with older people. Which social, financial and organisational 
circumstances help initiatives succeed and when do they fail?  
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We conducted 25 narrative interviews with emerging, completed or 
failed initiatives in Rhineland-Palatinate. Semi-structured interviews 
with political actors in villages and cities were added to include the 
institutional, administrative and political perspective. During the last 
years, 32 cohousing projects were completed in the mainly rural 
Rhineland-Palatinate (Germany), and the same number again  
is in the process of formation (see map on p. 70). 
The availability of a meeting room and access to land are 
crucial factors for the group-process and the realization of the  
ideas. A piece of land matching requirements is both a very 
pragmatic precondition and a major challenge in dense housing 
markets. Properties are often highly contested and initiatives  
are normally unable to compete with private investors or larger 
housing companies. Success depends on local authorities handing  
out land below market prices. “I have learned how people think  
and how they act if they really aim to maximise profit, and that  
is why they exploit others for their interests. That is a bitter 
experience I have made.” says a representative of an initiative,  
having experienced that the developer with whom they cooperated 
overbid the co-housing initiative and purchased the land itself. 
(Wittlich. L. 776–779). 
Some existing projects have successes in achieving their 
utopian ideas: co-creating high quality buildings and architecture, 
shared spaces, barrier-free apartments, common gardening, 
neighbourly support and self-management. Successful co-housing 
projects are important as they provide advice and serve as role 
models for other initiatives. In many cases they develop activities  
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for the wider local population and can be seen as incubators for  
new forms of social life. Tummers (2015) characterises this kind  
of co-housing and community life as an oasis, in opposition to  
co-housing as an island. In our research one urban project acquired 
a piece of land in an undesirable neighbourhood, stepping up to 
the challenge: “We are building in an inner urban area with a bad 
image. We are trying to attract people interested in living together 
and demonstrating a degree of solidarity in coping with the 
surroundings.” (Trier. L. 124–128). 
Self-organised, creative and sociable co-housing projects may 
develop the power to interrupt local routines and challenge local 
authorities. This social innovation may be one reason for the local 
authorities’ reluctance to embrace housing communities on their 
territory – at least in fairly rural environments. Some initiatives try to 
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become accepted year after year, but in several cases remain unable 
to convince the relevant persons in charge. Bottom-up processes  
in neighbourhoods do not necessarily correspond to administrative 
and political actions and procedures. Co-housing projects are 
regarded as demanding and/or proclaiming alternative lifestyles, e.g. 
trying to introduce sharing economies, ecological food production, 
becoming energetically self-sustaining and changing local power 
structures, may not be appreciated in local contexts and lack support 
in planning and delivery.
An essential driver for the desire for co-housing projects  
is the ideal of a peaceful, secure, socially homogeneous and 
community-orientated neighbourhood. Caring for one another and 
for one’s surroundings is linked to a strong place identity, something 
felt to be missing in inner cities and in large cities generally. Co-
housing initiatives imply a high level of social capital as they form an 
alternative to family and traditional support structures and engage 
in public life. As Putnam (1999) argued in his book “Bowling alone”, 
social problems may be solved if people work together as friends, 
neighbours or in networks. Social capital can be activated to get 
along and progress – or on the contrary – missing networks fail to 
overcome deficits and needs. Social capital is a focus especially in 
regimes that follow neoliberal ideas, holding the view that non-profit 
organisations or private associations should provide social services. 
Single parents, families with small children, older people and people 
with an alternative lifestyle benefit most from housing projects 
(Fedrowitz, Gailing 2003). But it can be questioned, to which extent 
co-ops and initiatives represent a reliable backbone for service 
provision and whether these groups are able to challenge local 
politics and influence governance structures.
Exclusiveness and middle class orientation are named as 
negative outcomes of housing projects. For financial reasons, 
co-housing can be fairly exclusive: “Well, that’s it, that’s only for 
the well-off. Others are not there, that’s a co-op. … Because of 
costs, very simple, you have to pay a fee and rental prices are also 
extremely high” (Speyer. L. 198-208). In the Rhineland-Palatinate,  
the focus is on mixed communities and housing for older people,  
but nevertheless, criticism of homogenous social groups with a 
fairly high social status was mentioned in the interviews, which also 
implies high levels of social control. Foreigners, for example, are 
clearly underrepresented, if not non-existent. Urban oriented people 
may miss social diversity and the mix of social classes and cultures  
in the nearby environment (co-housing as an island). 
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In many cases, co-housing projects bring new life to com-
munities as a whole. They may be regarded as an instrument for 
integrative planning and innovative bottom-up strategies for urban 
and rural development. Co-housing projects and cooperatives may 
even gain importance for social change not only on the project  
or local level, but also on the societal level, if they are able to reach 
out and promote social innovations (Szypulski 2008). On the one 
hand, ecological, economic and social aspects of sustainability are 
more central to housing projects than to “normal” neighbourhoods. 
On the other hand, local projects are clearly limited and unable 
to take over state responsibility for social support, organisational 
backbone and the reduction of social problems mainly linked  
to inequality and a lack of opportunities to take part in society.
Members of co-ops gain experience and knowledge in ways 
never considered before embarking on the project. Persuading 
authorities of their idea creates a sense of empowerment and 
confidence in trying new ways of problem solving. Completed 
projects prosper, where the stability of members is given, different 
roles are accepted, and the sense of place and community is well 
developed. If projects reach out, cities and villages profit from  
new activities, networks and interesting dwellings with communal 
space – even if they don’t share the co-ops residents values  
and lifestyles. Urban quality of life may be at risk where closing-off 
strategies and exclusion of otherness gain the upper hand.
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